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A New Standard for Presumptions in Criminal Cases: Ulster County Court v.
Allen'—On March 28, 1973, a car containing three adult males and a 16 year
old female was stopped for speeding on the New York State Thruway.'
When the investigating officer approached the car he observed two large-
caliber handguns through the window. The guns were positioned cross-wise in
an open handbag which was placed on either the front floor or the front seat
of the car, next to the female passenger.' A search of the car also uncovered
a loaded machine gun and over a pound of heroin in the trunk. 4 All four
passengers were tried on charges of possession of the two handguns, the
machine gun and the heroin. 'The four were convicted of possession of the
handguns and acquitted on the other charges.''
At trial, the four defendants objected to the introduction into evidence of
the handguns, the machine gun and the drugs, arguing that the state had not
adequately demonstrated a connection between the defendants and the con-
traband." The trial court overruled the objection, relying on a New York
statute which provides that, with certain exceptions, the presence of a firearm
in an automobile is evidence of its illegal possession by all persons then oc-
cupying the vehicle.' In his instructions to the jury, the trial judge stated that
the jury could presume possession of the guns by all the occupants of the car
on the basis of the New York statute." The instructions made it clear that the
jury was free to accept or reject the presumption, and that the presumption
would disappear if substantial contradictory evidence were adduced."
442 U.S. 140 (1979).
2 Id. at 143.
3 Id.
4, Id.
5 hi, at 144.
" Id.
7 Id, NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1980) states:
The presence in an automobile, other than a stolen one or a public (mi-
nibus, of any firearm, defaced firearm, firearm silencer, explosive incen-
diary bomb, gravity knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, billy, blackjack, metal
knuckles, chucks stick, sandbag, sandclub or slingshot is presumptive evi-
dence of its possession by all persons occupying such automobile at the
time such weapon is found, except under the following circumstances:
(a) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found upon the person
of one of the persons therein:
(b) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found in an automobile
which is being operated for hire by a duly licensed driver in the due, law-
ful and proper pursuit of his trade, then such presumption shall not apply
to the driver; or
(c) if the weapon so found is a pistol or revolver and one of the occu-
pants, not present under duress, has in his possession a valid license to have
and carry concealed the same.
The three male defendants also moved to dismiss the charges relating to the handguns
on the grounds that the statute could not be applied to them. 442 U.S. at 145_ The girl
admitted that the handbag that the guns were found in was hers. Id. at 143. Since
under section 3(a) of the law, the presumption doesn't apply if the guns are found
"upon the person" of one of the occupants of the car, the male defendants claimed the
presumption was inapplicable to them. Id. at 145.
8
 442 U.S. at 145.






On appeal, the defendants claimed that the statutory presumption had
been improperly applied. The statute contains an on the person" exception
which makes the presumption unavailable if the weapon is found on the per-
son of one of the occupants of the automobile." The three male defendants
claimed that the presumption was not applicable in this case because the guns
were found in the female defendant's pocketbook. The appeal also contained
a claim by all four of the defendants that the evidence, apart from the pre-
sumption, was insufficient to sustain the convictions, and that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied in this case. The convictions were affirmed by the
Appellate Division " and the New York Court of Appeals. 12
The three adult male defendants 13
 then filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, claiming that the presumption was unconstitutional both on its
face and as applied to their case. The district court issued the writ, holding
that the statute was unconstitutional as applied in the case because it was not
reasonable to infer possession of the handguns by the male defendants upon
proof of the presence of the handguns in the girl's handbag." The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on different grounds, holding that
the statute was unconstitutional on its face without considering whether the
presumption was constitutional as applied in this case."
The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari 16
and reversed the decision of the court of appeals. The Court HELD: I) that
the New York statute created a "permissive presumption"" which had to be
evaluated as applied to the record before the Court; '$ and 2) that a permis-
sive presumption is constitutional if the ultimate fact presumed is "more likely
than not to flow from" the basic facts proved by the prosecution."
In applying this standard to the presumption involved in Ulster, the Court
found that there was a "rational connection" between the basic facts proved by
the prosecution (the defendants' presence in the automobile and the location
of the guns in the car) and the ultimate fact presumed (possession of the guns
by the defendants), and that the latter was "more likely than not to flow
from" the former." The Court concluded, therefore, that the presumption
comported with due process.
See note 7 supra.
" People v. Lemmons, 49 A.D.2d 639, 370 N.Y.S.2d 243 (App. Div. 1975).
1 ' People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 354 N.E.2d 836 (1976).
13 The I 6-year old girl received a 5-year probationary sentence and was not a
party in the federal court proceedings. Allen v. County Court, Ulster County, 568 F.2d
998, 1000 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977).
H 442 U.S. at 146.
'' Allen v. County Court, Ulster County, 568 F.2d 998, 1009 (2d Cir. 1977).
'" 439 U.S. 815 (1978).
' 7 A permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to accept or reject the fact
inferred by the presumption anti does not shift the burden of persuasion or produc-
tion. See text at note 30 infra.
'" 442 U.S. at 162-63.
'" Id. at 167. ,
2 " Id. at 165.
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Justice Powell, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall, Stewart
and Brennan, concluded that the presumption was not consistent with the
requirements of due process.' While agreeing with the majority that the fact
presumed should be required to be "more likely than not to flow" from the
facts proved, the dissent stated that due process requires all factual inferences
recommended to the jury to be accurate reflections of what history, common
sense and experience tell us about the relations between events in our soci-
ety.' Applying this test, the dissent would have found the challenged pre-
sumption to be unconstitutional because people present in an automobile in
which a gun is found are not "more likely than not" to be in possession of
that gun."
The holding of Ulster jeopardizes due process rights guaranteed defen-
dants by previous cases. The use of presumptions in criminal cases implicates
due process concerns because of the effect a presumption may have on the
prosecution's constitutionally required burden of proof. In re Winship held
that the due process clause requires the prosecution to prove every fact which
constitutes the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." When a pre-
sumption is invoked to aid the prosecution in proving a fact which is an ele-
ment of the crime charged, it must be tested to ensure that the conclusion it
permits follows beyond a reasonable doubt. To satisfy this due process re-
quirement, the Ulster Court held that the prosecution could rely on all of the
evidence in the record to meet the reasonable doubt standard. 25 Therefore,
as long as the presumed fact is "more likely than not to flow from" the facts
proved by the prosecution and all of the evidence in the case permits a con-
clusion of the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, the Ulster standard
holds that the presumption comports with due process. This standard ignores
the possibility that the jury may base its finding of the presumed fact on the
presumption alone, without considering whether all the facts of the case lead
to such a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. 26
 If such is the case, an
element of the crime has not been found beyond a reasonable doubt since the
Ulster standard does not require that the presumed fact flow from the proved
fact(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. In this way, the Ulster holding jeopardizes
the due process rights guaranteed in Winship.
]'o demonstrate the way in which presumptions may threaten the defen-
dant's clue process rights, 27 this casenote will begin by discussing the types of
21 Id. al. 168 (Powell, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 172 (Powell, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 173 (Powell, J., dissenting).
24
 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); accord, Patterson v. New York, .4:32 U.S. 197, 204
(1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975).
25 442 U.S. at 167.
2"
 The probability of this occurring has been recognized by the Court previously.
As stated in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), "[Ole normal assumption is that
the jury will follow the statute, and, acting in accordance with the authority it confers,
will accept as sufficient what the statute expressly so describes." Id. at 237.
" In his dissent in Turner v, United States, 396 U.S, 398 (1970), Justice Black
listed eight of the defendant's constitutional rights which are threatened by the use of
presumptions in criminal prosections:
1. His right not to be compelled to answer for a capital or otherwise in-
famous crime unless on a present/Pell( or indictment of a grand jury;
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presumptions used in criminal cases and the due process concerns raised by
their use. It will then examine cases involving presumptions prior to Ulster.
The majority and dissenting opinions in Ulster will be analyzed next. The final
section will contain a discussion of the significance of Ulster and the infirmities
that remain with the Ulster standard. It will be suggested that due process
requires that all presumptions which aid the prosecution in proving an ele-
ment of the crime charged satisfy a beyond a reasonable doubt test on their
face before they may be constitutionally employed at trial.
1. THE OPERATION OF PRESUMPTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES
A. A Working Definition
A presumption is a procedural device used for allocating the burden of
producing evidence.'" Generally, a presumption operates by aiding a party
in proving a fact (fact A) by proving another fact (fact B). When a party has
the burden of proving a fact A it can satisfy this burden if there is an applica-
ble presumption by proving fact B, whereupon fact A is presumed."• There
is no real consensus among courts or commentators concerning the effect of
presumptions.'" Courts have employed the device in four ways. First, it has
been said that proof of the basic fact (fact B), which leads to a presumption of
the presumed fact (fact A), allows the party which has the burden of proof on
the issue requiring a finding of fact A to avoid a directed verdict on that issue
by proving B, and that this constitutes prima facie evidence of A.3 ' The sec-
'ond method requires an instruction to the jury, once proof of fact B has been
introduced, that they may infer fact A upon proof of fact B, in addition to
2. The right to be informed of the nature arid cause of' the accusation
against him;
3. The right not to be compelled to be a winless against himself;
4. The right not to be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law;
5. The right to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
6. The right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses for his defense;
7. The right to counsel; and
8. The right to trial by an impartial jury.
Id. at 425 (Black, J., dissenting).
26 See JAMES & HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.9 (2d ed. 1977).
24 See generally C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 803-05 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK); LAFAVE & SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 146-48 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
LAFAVE & Sco-rd. The presumption employed in Ulster serves as a good example. See
note 7 supra. By relying on that statute, it is possible for the prosecution to prove
possession of a firearm by an occupant of an automobile just by proving that the
defendant was present in the automobile in which the firearm was found. Thus, by
proving the defendant's presence in the automobile at the time the firearm was found
(fact B), the prosecution can satisfy its burden of proof on the issue of the defendant's
possession of the firearm (fact A).
30 One commentator has listed eight different methods in which courts have
employed presumptions. See Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52
MICH. L. REV. 195, 196-207 (1953); see also E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
31-32 (1962) [hereinafter cited as MORGAN].
31 Note, The Constitutionality of Statutory Criminal Law Presumptions, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 141, 141-42 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Note]; LAFAVE & Scorr, supra
note 29, at 146.
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preventing a directed verdict on the issue of fact. A. Presumptions employed
in these two ways are commonly referred to as permissive presumptions or
inferences since they permit, but don't require, a finding of fact A upon
proof of fact .B. No transfer of the burden of production or persuasion is•said
to occur with these presumptions, 32
 Alternatively, the instruction to the jury
may require the factfinder to find fact A upon proof of B unless the opposing
party produces sufficient evidence to rebut a finding of fact A. 33 This results
in a shifting of the burden of' production to the party against whom the pre-
sumption has been invoked. 34
 'The fourth way presumptions are employed is
to shift the burden of persuasion, as well as the burden of production, on the
issue of fact A to the opposing party upon proof of fact B. 35
 These last two
types of presumptions are commonly considered to be manadatory because
they require a finding of the presumed fact by the jury if the defendant does
not meet his burden of proof on that issue."" Because permissive presump-
tions do not shift the burden of production or persuasion to the defendant,
they are the type most commonly employed in criminal cases; a shift of either
of these burdens to the defendant jeopardizes many of the defendant's con-
stitutionally protected rights. 37
In order to determine the effect the presumption has on the burden of
proof, the judge's instructions to the jury must. be
 analyzed. 3 • An explana-
" See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 341, 342-43 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Stanford Note]; MORGAN, supra note 30,
at 31. Although there may not be a shift in the burden of production, a - permissive
presumption" still results in the defendant bearing the risk of non-production. This
means that if the defendant fails to produce evidence to rebut the presumption, he
runs the risk that the jury will rely on the presumption to make the conclusion which
it permits. While the use of such a presumption may not technically increase the de-
fendant's burden of proof, it certainly may aid I he prosecution in meeting its burden,
and can result in a conviction that could not have been attained without the presump-
tion's aid. See McCoRmicK, supra note 29, at 8l2.
23
 Chicago Note, supra note 31, at 141.
34 Id. at 142.
35 Id.
°" See LAFAVF. & SCOTT, supra note 29, at 147-48.
37 See Chicago Note, supra note 31, at 142; see also McCoRmicK, supra note 29, at
331.
28
 When a presumption applies to an issue in a case, the judge generally includes
in his instructions to the jury an explanation of the effect the presumption has on the
determination of that issue. A good example of the court's role in implementing a
relevant presumption is given in the ALI Moot-a. PENAL CODE, Tentative Draft No. 4:
(5) When the code establishes a presumption with respect to any fact.
which is an element of an offense, it has the following consequences (a)
when there is evidence of the facts which give use to the presumption, the
issue of the existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury,
unless the Court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly negatives
the presumed fact; and (b) when the issue of the existence of the pre-
sumed fact must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt, the law declares that the jury may regard the facts giving use to the
presumption as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact.
ALI MODEL PENAL CODE §1.13(5) (Tent. Draft No, 4, 1955). The manner in which a
judge explains a presumption's effect to the jury varies. A common method of invok-
ing a statutory presumption is to incorporate verbatim the statute containing the pre-
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tion to the jurors that they are free to accept or reject a presumption's infer-
ence upon proof of the basic fact, and that there need not be any affirmative
proof to rebut the presumption's inference in order to reject it, makes the
permissive nature of the presumption clear and does not result in a shift of
the burden of production. 40 By contrast, an instruction which merely states
that proof of the basic fact is sufficient evidence to permit a conclusion of the
presumed fact unless the defendant produces sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption requires the defendant to persuade the jury as to his innocence
on the issue in addition to producing evidence to rebut the presumption. Ac-
cordingly, the burdens of persuasion and production are shifted. 4 ' Finally,
an, instruction which requires the jury to make a finding of the presumed fact
upon proof of the basic fact has a conclusive effect which makes it impossible
for the defendant to rebut the presumption. 42 Thus, the decision of the ef-
fect of the presumption on the burden of proof is a crucial element in deter-
mining .whether a defendant's constitutionally protected rights have been vio-
lated,
B. Defendant's Rights Threatened by the Use of Presumptions
The use of a presumption permits a conclusion of a fact A upon proof of
another fact B. Permitting such a conclusion without direct proof of fact A
potentially abridges a defendant's constitutionally protected rights." First,
the presumption weakens the "presumption of innocence' as to fact A with
sumprion into the jury instructions, see, e.g., United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136,
138 (1965); Uriego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1962), or else the judge
will instruct the jury on the inference which the statute calls for in his own words, see,
e.g., Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 160-61 nn.19-20 (1979). For a general
discussion of proper methods of instructing the jury, see Morgan, Instructing the Jury
Upon Presumptions and the Burden of Proof 47 1-1ARv. f.. REV. 59 (1933).
'" Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-59 n.16 (1979); see also
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), When determining the type of presump-
tion involved, the test is how a juror reasonably could have interpreted the jury in-
struction on the presumption, and it is the province of the appellate court to deter-
mine how the jury might have understood the instructions. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 519.
4 ' ) See, e.g., Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 160-63 (1979).
-II See Chicago Note, supra note 31, at 142. The determination of the effect the
presumption has had on the burden of production and persuasion is crucial to the
determination of the effect the presumption has had on the prosecution's required
burden of proof at trial.
42 See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979).
" In his dissent in Turner justice Black listed eight of the defendant's constitu-
tional rights that are threatened by the use of presumptions. 442 U.S. at 425 (Black, J.,
dissenting); see note 27 supra. For a discussion of the merits of Justice Black's position,
see Fuller & Ulrich, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Statutory Presumptions that Lessen
the Burden of the Prosecution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 420 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Fuller
& Ulrich]: see generally Comment, Statutory Criminal Presumptions.' Reconciling the Practical
With the Sacrosanct, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 157, 164-81 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Commend; Stanford Note, .supra note 32, at 347-52.
" The "presumption of innocence" is not a presumption at all, but is just another
way of' stating the rule chat the prosecution has the burden of proving the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See McCoRmicts, .supra note 34. at 829-30.
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which the defendant begins the trial." Second, because the presumption al-
lows a finding of fact A without direct proof of fact A, the defendant is argu-
ably deprived of his right to confront the witnesses against him. 46
 In effect,
the evidence on which the presumption's conclusion is based was presented
either in the legislatures or during caselaw development. This infringes the
defendant's right to a jury trial to the extent that the jury is basing their
findings not on evidence that has been put before them, but on the conclu-
sion made by a legislature or the courts. The prosecution has not been forced
to produce evidence on the point and the defendant has not been given an
opportunity to discredit that evidence.
Because a presumption aids the prosecution in proving a fact in the case
without requiring direct proof of that fact, it results in an effective lightening
of the prosecution's burden of proof and transfers some of that burden to the
defendant. As the persuasive weight of the presumption increases, it relieves
the prosecution of its obligation to prove every element of the crime charged.
As the presumption shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, it may
trammel on the defendant's right not to testify, since his own testimony may
be his only available means to rebut the presumption. 47
 As the magnitude of
the shift in the burden of proof increases, the threat of these infringements of
the defendant's constitutional rights grows and the use of presumptions be-
comes more suspect.
C. Reasons for the Creation of Presumptions
It may be asked why a device that imperils constitutionally protected
rights is needed to alter the allocation of the burden of proof during a trial.
There are a number of justifications given for the creation of presump-
tions." They save the cost and time of proving the same relationship be-
tween similar events in every case, and provide a more uniform result." In
addition, they serve as a general aid in law enforcement.''" Presumptions also
may be created to correct an imbalance resulting from one party's superior
access to proof." While these reasons express the aid they give to pros-
45
 Some commentators have expressed the opinion that the practical effect of the
introduction of a presumption is to destroy the presumption of innocence regarding
the presumed fact without introducing any direct evidence proving the presumed fact.
See Ashford & Rissinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A
Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 176 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ashford & Ris-
singer].
4 " Id.
4 7 Id .
4 " See generally Fuller & Ulrich, supra note 43, at 427-28: McCoRmicx, supra note
29, at 806-11; MORGAN, supra note 30, al 32-34.
4"
 Fuller & Ulrich, supra note 43, at 427.
''' Id.
5 ' McCoRmicx, supra note 29, at 806-07. A good example of this type of presumption
is the presumption of carrying on bootlegging from proof of presence at an illegal still.
Because of the secrecy that surrounds the bootlegging trade, it is very difficult to get
proof of the nature of somebody's involvement at the still, while it is rational to pre-
sume they are somehow engaged in the operation. See, e.g., United States v. Gainey,
380 U.S. 63, 67 (1965) (upholding such a statute).
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ecutors, their creation generally reflects a different justification, a judgment
of probability. Most presumptions reflect a conclusion by judges or legislators
that proof of fact B renders the existence of fact. A so probable that it is
sensible and time-saving to assume the truth of fact. A until the adversary
disproves it. i 2
Presumptions may serve another purpose which benefits defendants as
well as prosecutors. Through the use of presumptions, legislators are more
willing to define crimes narrowly, realizing that prosecutors can rely on pre-
sumptions to prove commission of the described crime. This practice gives the
defendant the opportunity to rebut the evidence indicating criminal activity
and, thereby, avoid criminal liability. If the legislature were prohibited from
enacting presumptions, it might be less willing to define crimes narrowly. The
legislature might prefer not to place a heavy burden of proof on the prosecu-
tion if the prosecution cannot rely on presumptions, and instead might create
more general crimes by making the basic facts crimes themselves.'" This
change would enlarge the class of persons who would he convicted by the
number who would have been able to rebut the presumptions. In this way,
presumptions can provide defenses to the accused that might not be available
under the forseeable alternative." By providing these "defenses," legislators
can define a crime broadly enough to encompass activities harmful to the
society while enabling those whose activities are not harmful to rebut the in-
ference of criminality created by the presumption.5 •
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEST FOR PRESUMPTIONS
The origin of the current standard used for testing presumptions in crim-
inal cases can be traced to Tot v. United States. 5 ' Tot involved a statute ''
which presumed from a prisoner's prior conviction of a crime of violence and
his present possession of a firearm or ammunition that (1) the article was_
received by him in interstate or foreign commerce, and (2) such receipt oc-
curred subsequent to July 30, 1938, the effective date of the statute. In reviewing
32
 MCCORMICK, supra note 34, at 807.
53
 Fuller & Ulrich, supra note 43, at 428-29. This type of reasoning was the basis
for one of the early standards developed by the Court to test presumptions which was
rejected in Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). See note 58 infra and accom-
panying text. The "greater includes the lesser" standard provided that a statutory pre-
sumption was constitutional if the legislature had the power to make the basic fact,
which led to the inference of the elemental fact, a crime itself. See Ferry v. Ramsay,
277 U.S. 88 (1928).
34 Fuller & Ulrich, supra note 40, at 429.
55 Id. A good example is the bootlegging statute enacted by Congress. This statute
creates a presumption of "carrying on" the business of the illegal production of liquor
upon proof' of "unexplained presence" at the still, 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b) (1976). This
device enabled Congress to include everyone participating in the illegal operation and
still give those who had wandered onto the scene an opportunity to prove their inno-
cence. The use of this device is admittedly preferable if the alternative is to make
presence itself a crime.
36 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
57 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1964).
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the statute, the Supreme Court held that there must be a rational connection
between the fact proved and the fact. presumed,"" and emphasized that, the
connect i( 01 made by the presumption must. be one that follows in common
experience.''" The test used by the Court. made no reference to the specific
facts of' the case, but instead examined the conclusion made by the statute and
found that it could not be rationally supported by any argument drawn from
experience." The government. sought to support the presumption by show-
ing that, in most states, laws required those acquiring firearms either to make
a record of the transaction resulting in the acquisition or to register owner-
ship. The Court, however, rejected the government's argument, stating that
the presumption did not f011ow rationally because a number of states had no
such laws, and that, in any event., it. could not be presumed that a firearm had
been lawfully acquired or that it had not been transferred interstate prior to
the adoption of state regulation."' Tot did not specify the type of presump-
tion to which its "rational connection - test applies. The opinion mentioned all
four types of presumptions and thus left ambiguity to be resolved in future
decisions." 2 The presumption in Tot appears to have shifted the burden of
producing evidence, but not the burden of persuasion, to the defendant." 3 It
permitted the jury to rely on the presumption alone once the basic facts were
proved, but didn't require such reliance. If the defendant failed to produce
any evidence to rebut this presumption, he ran the risk that the jury would
5 8 319 U.S. at 467 -68. Before the issuance of Tot there were two other tests which
were also considered applicable. The "greater includes the lesser" test ruled that a
statutory presumption was permissible if the legislature had the power to make the
fact proved which triggered the presumption a crime itself. See Ferry v. Ramsay, 277
U.S. 88, 94 (1928). This theory was rejected by the Tot Court. 319 U.S. at 472. Tot also
reduced to a corollary the "comparative convenience" test. Id. at.469. This standard
tested a presumption by looking at the comparative convenience for the defense and
prosecution of producing evidence, and permitted the burden of producing evidence
to be shifted to the defense if there was "a manifest disparity in convenience of proof
and opportunity for knowledge." Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 91 (1934).
'" 319 U.S. at 467-68. The opinion stated:
a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connec-
tion between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. if the infer-
ence of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of
connection between the two in common experience where the inference
is so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of
life as we know them, it is not competent for the legislature to create it as a
rule governing the procedure of courts.
Id. (citations omitted).
"" Id. at 468.
" Id. Similarly, the Court found no basis for the inference from mere possession
that the firearm had been acquired subsequent to the effective date of the statute, or
for the inference of procurement or purchase of ammunition in interstate commerce
from proof of its possession. Id.
62 Sec Chicago Note, supra note 31, at 144-46; see also Note, Tot v. United States:
Constitutional Restrictions on Statutory Presumptions, 56 HARV. Rev. 1324 (1943).
"3 The Court described the effect the presumption had on the burden of proof:
"the statute in question ... leaves the jury free to act on the presumption alone once
the specified facts are proved, unless the defendant comes forward with opposing evi-
dence." 319 U.S. at 469.
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rely on the presumption in making their decision. It' thiS occurred, the pros-
ecution would have succeeded in proving the fact inferred by the presump-
tion without producing any direct evidence on that point.
The Court's main concern in Tot was that the prosecution be put to its
proof. The opinion stated that it is incumbent upon the prosecution to pro-
duce evidence'at trial sufficient to support a verdict." Although it admitted
that the prosecution may be aided by a presumption created by the legislature
that, is based on evidence not presented to the jury, the Court required that
the inference be supported by the circumstances of life, as we know them,
before a verdict could be based on it."' A logical reading of the holding in
Tot appears to be that due process requires a presumption to be rationally
supported by sufficient empirical evidence to fulfill the prosecution's burden
of proof before, the jury may be permitted to rely on it to convict.
The rational connection test announced in Tot was applied in United States
v. Gainey" and in United States v. Romano," thereby establishing it as the
primary test to be applied in testing criminal presumptions." Gainey and
Romano both involved statutes which presumed involvement in the illegal
manufacture of liquor upon proof of the defendant's presence at the still site.
The statutes provided that proof of such presence "shall be deemed sufficient
evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such presence
to the satisfaction of the jury...." "" Th e trial judge included this language
from the statute in his instructions but instructed that proof of presence did
not require the jury to convict. The quoted lanaguage, the judge instructed,
only meant that the jury may' convict if all the evidence considered together
supported this conclusion." The jury returned guilty verdicts on the charges
of possession, custody or control of a still and on the charges of carrying on
" 4 Id. at 466-67.
Id. at 468.
"" 380 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1965).
" 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
" In Romano the Court said:
The test to be applied to the kind of statutory inference involved in this
case is not in dispute. In Tot v. United States, [citation omitted] the Court,
relying on a line of cases dating from 1910, reaffirmed the limits which the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments place 'upon the power of Congress or
that of' a state legislature to make the proof of one fact or group of facts
evidence of the existence of the ultimate fact on which guilt is predicated.'
Id. at 139.
"" 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(2) (1964) (amended 1976).
7 " 380 U.S. at 69-70• This often has been referred to as the "permissive inference"
doctrine. The essence of this doctrine is that the statute empowers the judge to decide
whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of the presumed fact "beyond
a reasonable doubt" before submitting the issue to the jury. and therefore does not
interfere with his control user the proceedings. Also, as long as the judge still instructs
the jury on its responsibility to find each fact "beyond a reasonable doubt," including
the fact presumed, use of the presumption does not abridge the defendant's right to a
trial by jury. See Note. Criminal Statutory Presumptions and Ihe Reasonable Doubt Standard
of Proof: Is Due Process Overdue?, 19 S -r. Louts U.L.J. 223, 229-33 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as St. Louis Notel; Comment, supra note 43, at 166-68.
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the business of a distiller or rectifier without having given bond as required
by law.'
Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the statute as creating a permis-
sive inference that authorizes, but does not require a jury to convict solely on
evidence of the defendant's presence. 72
 While not specifically stating the pre-
sumption's effect, the Court appeared to interpret it to shift the burden of
producing evidence to the defendant while leaving the burden of persuasion
on the prosecution. The opinion stated that "[elven if it found that the de-
fendant had been present at the still, and that his presence remained un-
explained, the jury could nonetheless acquit him if it found that the Govern-
ment had not proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 73
 Thus, the jury
was free to accept the presumption's inference, but was not required to.
In determining the constitutionality of the presumption, the Court stated
that the determination of the constitutionality of the presumption depended
"upon the rationality of the connection between the facts proved and the ul-
timate fact presumed ... ," and that this process was, "by its nature, highly
empirical . ..." 74
 Support for the rationality of the presumption's conclusion
was found in the legislature's recognition of the secrecy that surrounds the
bootlegging industry, and in the likelihood that someone present at a still
would be engaged in the broad offense of "carrying on" the enterprise of
illegal distillation. The Court noted the weight that should be accorded Con-
gress' capacity to amass the stuff of actual experience and cull conclusions
from it," especially in matters that are not within specialized judicial compe-
tence. 75
 By examining the empirical evidentiary basis for the inference made
by the presumption in Gainey, the Court sought to ensure that the due process
concern expressed in Tot was satisfied. The rational connection test ac-
complishes this goal by looking to evidence not presented to the jury which
supports the conclusion made by the presumption. In this way the test pur-
71 380 U.S. at 64. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, and held
that neither the presumption of "carrying on" the business of a distiller nor of posses-
sion of an illegal still front proof of' mere presence had a sufficient material basis to
satisfy the due process requirements set out in Tot. Barnett v. United States, 322 F.2d
292, 300 (5th Cir. 1963). The Supreme Court then granted certiorari. 375 U.S. 962
(1964).
72 380 U.S. at 68. Because the Court found the presumption of "carrying on" the
business of distilling to he constitutional, it did not reach the question of the constitu-
tionality of the presumption of possession since the defendant had received concurrent
sentences for the two charges. Id. at 65.
73 Commentators have expressed the opinion that the practical effect of such an
instruction is to shift the burden of persuasion as well as the burden of production.
Compare Ashford & Rissinger, supra note 45, at 201-02, with St. Louis Note, supra note
69, at 231. It should be noted that the transfer in the burden of producing evidence
here is not a true shift of that burden since such a shift would require a directed
verdict against the defendant if he failed to meet his production burden. A directed
verdict would infringe many of the defendant's constitutional rights. What is involved
here, then, is a "permissive inference" which permits, but does not require, the jury to
find the existence of the presumed fact. See MCCORMICK, supra note 29, at 804.
74 380 U.S. at 66-67.
" Id. at 67.
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ports to ensure that the conclusion which the presumption empowers the jury
to make has a sufficient factual basis to satisfy constitutional requirements.'"
Soon after Gainey the "rational connection - test was applied to a similar
statutory presumption in United States v. Romano. The statute in Romano pre-
sumed possession, custody and control of an illegal still upon proof of pres-
ence at the still site. 77
 The Supreme Court struck down the statute, and
held that the connection between presence at a still and possession is too
tenuous to permit a reasonable inference of guilt.'" To judge the rationality
of the inference, the Court cited other cases which held that a conviction for
possession cannot be based solely on the evidence of presence. 7 " The Court
also noted the high probability that someone present at a still is engaged in
one of the supply, delivery or operational activities having nothing to do with
possession." In its analysis, the Court was again examining evidence not pre-
sented to the jury which supported the presumption to ensure that it was
backed by the constitutionally required quantum of proof.
The Romano opinion does not specify what effect the presumption had on
the allocation of the burden of proof, but it did state that the instruction
made it possible for the jury to disbelieve or disregard other evidence of pos-
session and convict the defendants based solely on the evidence of pres-
ence."' Therefore, although there was ample evidence in addition to pres-
ence at the still to support the charge of possession, the Court tested the
presumption assuming that the jury had relied on it alone in reaching its
conclusion. 82 By doing this, the Court made it clear that the weight of the
76 The Court in Gainey also dealt with two other constitutional claims. It had been
argued that use of the presumption of "carrying on" the business of an illegal distillery
impinged upon the trial judge's power over the judicial proceeding, and that it
abridged the defendant's right to a trial by jury. In dealing with the first claim, the Court
stated that since the statute leaves it within the trial judge's discretion whether to sub-
mit the case to the jury when the only evidence is of presence, this did not interfere
with the judge's responsibility to withhold a case from the jury when the evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction. Id. at 68. The Court's response
to the second claim noted that since the presumption did not prevent the jury from
being properly instructed as to reasonable doubt, it did not interfere with the jury's
proper role as fact finders. Id. at 68-69. See note 70 supra. Although these subsidiary
holdings reflect the Court's awareness of these constitutional claims, they aren't the
primary concerns which the "rational connection" is intended to protect. They appear
to have conic in response to justice Black's contention in dissent that the presumption
violated several constitutional provisions. See id. at 74-88; see also Chicago Note, supra
note 31, at 149-50.
" United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 137 (1965), citing 26 U.S.C. § 5601(a)(1)
(1970) (amended 1976).
78 382 U.S. at 141.
79 Id. at 141.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 138-39. The trial court, in instructing the jury, read verbatim the applica-
ble provisions of the statute which provided, in part, that presence of the defendant at
the site of an illegal still "shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction,
unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction of the jury... ." Id. at
137, citing 26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(1) (1970) (amended 1976).
82 See note 81 supra and text at note 69 supra.
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supporting evidence in the case should not be considered in reviewing a pre-
sumption - which authorizes the jury to base a conviction solely on the pre-
sumption's inference.
The trial courts' instructions in Romano and Gainey were virtually the
same, except that the Gainey court made it clear that. the jury should reject.
the presumption's inference if all the evidence considered together did not
support this conclusion. Although it can be argued that this omission from the
instructions in Romano resulted in a greater shift in the burden of proof," the
Court did not choose this ground to distinguish the two cases. Instead, the
Romano opinion pointed to the firm rational foundation for the inference
made by the presumption in Gainey, as compared to the lack c)1' support for
the presumption's inference in Romano," It was that lack of evidentiary sup-
port in light of common experience that rendered the presumption infirm in
Romano, not the shift in the burden of proof.
The rational connection standard was further developed in Leary v. United
States. 85 The challenged statute in Leary presumed the defendant's know-
ledge of the illegal importation of marijuana upon proof of his possession,
and provided that proof of "such possession shall be deemed sufficient evi-
dence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains his possession to
the satisfaction of the jury." 86 The jury was instructed that it could convict
relying on the presumption's inference of knowledge," and it found the de-
fendant guilty. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's con-
viction, and held that a criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as
unconstitutional unless it can be said with substantial assurance that the pre-
83 See Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-59 n.16 (1979); but see note
72 supra.
84
 The Court's language is instructive in showing the type of reasoning used to
analyze these presumptions:
Presence at an operating still is sufficient evidence to prove the charge of
"carrying on" because anyone present at the site is very probably connected
with the illegal enterprise. Whatever his job may be, he is at the very least
aiding and abetting the substantive crime of carrying on the illegal distill-
ing business.... But presence tells us nothing about what the defendant's
specific function was and carries no legitimate, rational or reasonable in-
ference that he was engaged in one of the specialized functions connected
with possession, rather than in one of the supply, delivery or operational
activities having nothing to do with possession. Presence is relevant and
admissible evidence in a trial on a possession charge; but absent some
showing of the defendant's function at the still, its connection with posses-
sion is too tenuous to permit a reasonable inference of guilt ....
382 U.S. at 141.
85 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
86 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964) (repealed 1970).
87 395 U.S. at 32 n.55. Again, the Court did not specify what effect the . presump-
tion had on the burden of proof. The language of the opinion seems to indicate that
the presumption permitted, but did not require, a conviction if possession was proved
and the defendant introduced no evidence to rebut the inference of knowledge. This
theoretically would cause a shift in the burden of producing evidence, but would leave
the burden of persuasion on the prosecution. The practical effect of such a presump-
tion, however, is likely to shift both burdens. See note 73 supra.
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sumed fact is "more likely than not to flow" from the proved fact on which it
is made to depend."
In reviewing the presumption, the Court reiterated the view expressed in
Romano that the presumption must be tested assuming that the jury convicted
relying on the presumption at face value and examining direct or circumstan-
tial data to determine whether the presumption is rationally valid.Hs Upon
review of this data, the Court found the inference invalid since there was not
a sufficient rational connection between the fact proved and the fact pre-
sumed." The Court, however, went beyond its conclusion that there was not
a sufficient rational connection for the presumption to satisfy the "more likely
than not" test. The Court noted that since the presumption that a person
possessing marijuana would know it to be illegally imported did not satisfy the
"more likely than not" standard, there was no requirement to consider
whether the truth of the presumed fact must also be inferrable from the truth
of the proven fact "beyond a reasonable doubt."' This was the first indica-
tion by the Court that the beyond a reasonable doubt test may be required in
testing presumptions. Although this statement by the Court did establish the
boundaries within which the test for presumptions must lie, it created consid-
erable confusion by leaving the question whether presumptions must satisfy
the "reasonable doubt" standard w future cases.
After Leary, the applicable standard remained the "more likely than not—
rational connection" test. The relevance of the Court's discussion of the
"reasonable doubt" standard in Lean, remained unresolved. In both Turner v.
United States"' and Barnes v. United States" 3 the Court refrained from deciding
whether criminal presumptions must satisfy the "reasonable doubt" standard
when they are invoked concerning a fact, proof of which is required for con-
viction. In Turner the Court considered two statutory presumptions which au-
thorized the inference of knowledge of illegal importation from proof of the
defendant's possession of heroin and cocaine." 4 The Court tested the pre-
sumptions by looking to factual data on the importation of' heroin and
cocaine, similar to the analysis in Leary, and by looking to the lessons of corn-
88 395 U.S. at 36.
8 " Id. at 37-38. The Court began this analysis by noting the deference that must be
paid to Congress' conclusions. The Court concluded, however, that since the legislative
record did not supply an adequate basis upon which to judge the soundness of the
presumption it was necessary to consult all of the available evidence which showed ihe
percentage of marijuana imported and marijuana users' knowledge of importation. Id.
at 38-39. This analysis marked the first time since Tot that the Court had expanded its
empirical analysis to include outside factual data to supplement the knowledge culled
from general knowledge and experience. See MCCORMICK, supra note 34, at 814-15.
"" 395 U.S. at 52.
Id. at 36 n.64.
"' 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
"' 4 l2 U.S. 837 (1973).
" 4 21 U.S.C.	 l74 (1964) (repealed 1970); 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1964) (repealed
1970). The jury was instructed ihal possession of a narcotic drug was sufficient evi-
dence to justify conviction of the crime charged, and that the statute permitted, but
did not require, such a conclusion. 396 U.S. at 406 n.6.
1004	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 21:990
mon sense. The Court found that as to heroin, the presumption met both the
"more likely than not" and "reasonable doubt" standards." With regard to
cocaine, however, the Court held that neither test was satisfied." In Barnes
the Court held that the inference of knowledge .that goods possessed were
stolen from proof of the unexplained possession of stolen goods satisfied the
"reasonable doubt" standard, and therefore the more likely than not" test,
and thus accorded with due process."
Neither Turner nor Barnes did anything to affect the standard set out in
Leary. Both cases applied the "more likely than not—rational connection" test
without making any changes. Thus, when Ulster came before the Supreme
Court, the applicable test for presumptions which permit an inference of an
element of the crime charged was uncertain. Prior cases had clearly estab-
lished that due process requires that there by a rational connection between
the fact proved and the fact presumed, and that the presumed fact be more
likely than not to flow from the proved fact. The Court, however, had men-
tioned in three successive cases that due process also may require that pre-
sumptions pass a reasonable test, although the facts of the cases had made it
unnecessary for the Court to decide this issue. The relevance of this reasona-
ble doubt test to presumptions therefore had yet to be decided.
Although the applicable lest was somewhat in doubt, the analytic proce-
dure employed by the Court had been fairly uniform throughout the cases.
The presumptions were examined by assuming that the presumption had
been relied on by the jury to convict the defendant, irrespective of the other
evidence in the case. Their sufficiency was determined by an empirical
examination of relevant factual data or what common knowledge and experi-
ence tells us. As long as the trial judge's instructions had permitted the jury to
convict by relying on a presumption, the Court tested the presumptions with-
out considering the strength of the other evidence presented to the jury.
Thus, when the presumption issue was brought before the Court in Ulster, the
specific standard to be required was in doubt, but the procedure to be used in
analyzing the presumption seemed to be clear.
"" 396 U.S. at 417-18. 420.
''" Id. at 418-19, 422-29.
412 U.S. at 846. The Court's language is indicative of the uncertainty over the
applicable test:
What has been established by the cases ... is at least this: that if a statutory
inference submitted to the jury as sufficient to support conviction satisfies
the reasonable doubt standard ... as well as the more likely than not stan-
dard, then it clearly comports with due process.
Id. at 843. The jury instructions in Barnes made it clear that the inference was permis-
sive: "[Y]ou are never required to make this inference. It is the exclusive province of'
the jury to determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in
this case warrant any inference which the law permits the jury 10 draw from the pos-
session of recently stolen properly." Id. at 840 n.3. The Court stated that the practical
effect of the instruction was to shift the burden of going forward with evidence to the
defendant. and that this is permissible if the "rational connection" test has been satis-
fied. Id. at 846 n.11.
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III. ULSTER COUNTY COURT V. ALLEN
A. The Opinions
The Ulster opinion began its consideration of the presumption issue by
discussing the due process requirements which control the testing of criminal
presumptions."' If an evidentiary device is constitutionally valid, the Court
stated, it must not undermine the factfincler's responsibility at trial to find the
ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt." The validity of the presumption
under the due process clause depends on the strength of the connection be-
tween the particular basic and presumed facts involved, and on the degree to
which the device curtails the factfinder's freedom to assess the evidence intro-
duced at trial independent from the strength of the presumption.'" Thus,
the Court's primary concern in developing the proper test was to ensure that
the presumption did not alleviate the prosecution's responsibility to produce
sufficient evidence to find each fact beyond a reasonable doubt..
After setting out these due process requirements, the Court discussed
how different types of presumptions affect jurors' factfinding freedom. The
Court distinguished mandatory and permissive presumptions. According to
the Court, a mandatory presumption tells the trier of fact that he or she must
find the elemental presumed fact upon proof of the basic fact unless the de-
fendant comes forward with sufficient evidence to rebut the presumed con-
nection between the two facts."' A permissive presumption or inference, on
the other hand, allows—but does not require—the trier of fact to infer the
presumed fact from proof of the basic fact and places no burden of proof on
the defendant."' The Court then reasoned that since a permissive presump-
tion leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not
shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way
the trier could have made the connection permitted by the inference."'
" Before reaching the presumption issue, the Court considered whether the New
York courts had rejected the respondents' claim on the basis of an independent and
adequate state procedural ground that would bar the federal courts from addressing
the issue on habeas corpus. The Court concluded that there was no support in either
the law of New York or the history of the litigation for an inference that the New
York courts had decided the respondents' constitutional claim on a procedural ground,
and that the question of the presumption's constitutionality was therefore properly
before the Court. 442 U.S. at 148-49.
"" Id. at 156. Here the Court is referring to the due process guarantee, recognized
in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). that requires the prosecution to prove every
element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 364; see also Mullaney
v. liVilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702-03 n.31 (1975).
"" 442 U.S. at 156.
I' Id. at 157. The Court divided mandatory presumptions into two classes:
presumptions that merely shift the burden of production to the de-
fendant, following satisfaction of which the ultimate burden of persuasion
returns to the prosecution; and presumptions that entirely shift the burden
of proof to the defendant. The mandatory presumptions examined by our
cases have almost uniformly fit into the former subclass.
Id. at 156-58 n.16.
"2 Id. at 157. See text anti notes at notes 39-42 supra.
103 Id.
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Thus, according to the Court's reasoning, the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard would only come into play when a permissive presumption has been
used if the prosecution had not introduced enough evidence to support the
conclusion made by the presumption to make it possible for a juror to con-
clude the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Court
concluded, a permissive presumption must be viewed in light of the facts of
the case and the party challenging the presumption must demonstrate its in-
validity as applied to him.'" In contrast, the Court stated in dicta that a
mandatory presumption must be tested on its face, divorced from the facts of
the case;"5
 to uphold such a presumption, the fact proved must be sufficient
to support the inference of guilt. beyond a reasonable doubt."'
The Court went on to hold that the appropriate standard for testing
permissive presumptions is the "more likely than not test described in
Leary."' Since the prosecution may rely on all of the evidence in the record
to meet the reasonable doubt standard in cases involving a permissive pre-
sumption, the Court reasoned that
[t]here is no more reason to. require a permissive statutory pre-
sumption to meet a reasonable doubt standard before it may be
permitted to play any part in a trial than there is to require that
degree of probative force for other relevant evidence before it may
be admitted. As long as it is clear that the presumption is not the
sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt, it need only satisfy the
test described in Leary."'
This test, as it was applied in Ulster, requires that there be a "rational connec-
tion" between the specific basic facts proved by the prosecution in the case
and the ultimate fact presumed, and the latter must be found to be "more
likely than not to flow from" the former.'" Once this test is met, the convic-
tion employing the presumption must be upheld unless, under all the facts of
the case, there is no rational way the trier of fact could have found the fact
inferred by the presumption beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Ulster the Court tested the challenged presumption with this standard
and found it to be valid. The challenged statute presumed possession of a gun
upon proof of the defendants' presence in an automobile where the gun was
found.'" The Court analyzed the trial judge's instruction on the presump-
"4 Id. In holding that a defendant must demonstrate the invalidity of a permissive
presumption as applied to him, the Court was guided by the constitutional principle
that "[a] party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar
as it has an adverse impact on his own rights." Id. at 154-55.
"' Id. at 159.
"6 Id. at 167.
" 7 Id.
Jos Id.
1 " Id. at 165. The Court's language in this section of the opinion appears to indi-
cate that, in determining whether the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow
from the proved fact of a permissive presumption, one should look at the facts actually
proved by the prosecution in the case under review rather than only the fact men-
tioned in the statute which triggers the presumption. The dissent also reads the major-
ity opinion to say this. See id. at 176 (Powell, J., dissenting).





tion and found that it gave rise to a permissive inference."' Upon reaching
this conclusion, the Court looked to the facts of the case and concluded that
there was the requisite "rational connection" between the basic facts proved by
the prosecution and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the fatter was "more
likely than not to flow from" the former." 2 The Court then noted that the
New York Court of Appeals had concluded that the record as a whole was
sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,'" and thus
found that the reasonable doubt test was satisfied.
Justice Powell's dissent argued that the challenged presumption did not
satisfy the more likely than not" test."' His conclusion was based on the
belief that the rationality of the connection made by the presumption must be
judged not according to the facts of the particular case, but according to what
history, common sense and experience in general tell us about the relation
between events in our society."' The dissent stated that the trial court's in-
structions had permitted the jury to base a finding of possession solely on
proof of presence in the automobile."' Therefore, the dissent determined,
the presumption should have been analyzed assuming the jury had based its
conclusion solely on the inference permitted by the presumption, without con-
sidering the strength of the other evidence introduced to support the pre-
sumption's inference."' This conclusion marked a significant disagreement
with the majority opinion's finding that since the presumption only permitted,
and did not require, a finding of the presumed fact upon proof of the basic
fact, it had to be examined in light of the facts of the case. The dissent be-
lieved that under the majority's analysis, whenever it is determined that an
inference is "permissive," the only question is whether, in light of all of the
evidence adduced at trial, the inference recommended to the jury is a reason-
able one.'" This, according to the dissent, is simply an unarticulated harm-
"' 442 U.S. at 160-61. The Court described the permissive effect of the instruction:
The trial judge's instructions make it clear that the presumption was
merely a part of the prosecution's case, that it gave rise to a permissive
inference available only in certain circumstances ... and that it could be
ignored by the jury even if there was no affirmative proof offered by the
defendants in rebuttal,	 , In short, the instructions plainly directed the
jury to consider all the circumstances tending to support or contradict the
inference that all four occupants of the car had possession of the two
loaded handguns and to decide the matter for itself without regard to how
much evidence the defendants introduced,
Id.
Id. at 165.
"3 hi. at 167.
"4 Id. at 168 (Powell, 1,, dissenting).
"5 Id. at 172. The dissent traced this rule down through the cases beginning with
Tot and concluded that this requirement is the foundation of the "rational connection"
test. The dissent believed that the majority had only concentrated in testing the pre-
sumption on the possibility that the prosecution's burden of proof might he lessened
and had ignored this due process requirement. Id. at 16Y-70.
"K Id. at 175 n.7.
"7 Id. at 175-76. The dissent found that in prior cases the distinction between
"mandatory" and "permissive" presumptions had no importance in analyzing presump-
tions in criminal cases. Id. at 170 n.3.
I"' Id. at 177.
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less error standard which permits the use of any inference—no matter how
irrational in itself—provided that otherwise there is sufficient evidence in the
record to support a finding of guilt.'"
The dissent applied what it perceived to be the proper rational connec-
tion test to the challenged presumption and concluded that people present in
automobiles simply are not — more likely than not" possessors of those
weapons. 12 ° In reaching this conclusion, the dissent noted the general irra-
tionality of the presumption's conclusion and mentioned prior cases which
had refused to permit use of a presumption of possession in other contexts
from proof of mere presence.'" Since it concluded that the presumption of
possession of guns was not even more likely than not to flow from" proof of
presence in the car, the dissent found it unnecessary to reach the question
whether such a presumption must also follow beyond a reasonable doubt
when used to prove an element of the offense.'
B. The Significance of Ulster
Ulster has clarified the uncertainty that existed since Leary about the con-
stitutional standard presumptions must meet. It is now clear that the fact in-
ferred by a permissive presumption must be found "more likely than not to
flow" from the facts proved by the prosecution. Conversely, when testing a
mandatory presumption, the fact proved must be sufficient "on its face" to
support a finding of the fact presumed "beyond a reasonable doubt." 123 In
clearing up this confusion, however, the Court has diluted the effectiveness of
the standard. The requirements placed on a presumption by the test de-
veloped in Ulster depend on the effect the presumption has had on the alloca-
tion of the burden of proof. 124 The test operates by examining the trial
judge's instructions to the jury to determine whether the presumption is
mandatory or permissive. If the instruction makes it clear to the jury that they
are free to accept or reject the presumption's inference, and the presumption
is thereby considered "permissive," it must be evaluated as applied to the in-
dividual respondents based on the record before the court. In such a case, a
presumption which in the abstract makes a weak rational connection may be
upheld if the facts of the case lend strong support to the inference authorized
by the presumption.
This test ignores the due process requirements that underlie the "rational
connection" test. Since presumptions are created on the basis of evidence not
presented to the jury, due process requires that there be a minimum rational
119 Id.
12 " Id. at 173.
121 Id .
122
 Id. at 169 n.2.
123 Although this was said in dicta, it is likely to be considered authoritative for
future cases.
124 Powell's dissent pointed to the undue emphasis placed by the majority on the
allocation of the burden of proof: "1 do not agree with the Court's conclusion that the
only constitutional difficulty with presumptions lies in ihe danger of lessening the bur-
den of proof the prosecution must bear." 442 U.S. at 1691 (Powell, ,i., dissenting).
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connection between the facts proved and the fact presumed before the pre-
sumption may play a role in the trial.' 25 The cases prior to Ulster have ful-
filled this due process requirement by examining the factual basis for the in-
ference authorized by the presumption to determine its rationality. This was
accomplished in pre-Ulster cases by either reflecting on the dictates of com-
mon knowledge and experience, 126
 or by examining relevant factual data.'"
The Ulster test for "permissive" presumptions ignores this requirement and
instead requires only that, in light of all the evidence adduced at trial, the jury
be able rationally to infer the presumed fact. After Ulster, therefore, only
those presumptions judged to be "mandatory" will have their underlying ra-
tional sufficiency tested.
The effect of creating different standards for "mandatory" and "permis-
sive" presumptions will be to force appellate judges to scrutinize jury instruc-
tions to determine the type of presumption involved so that the proper test
can be applied. Because of the similarity in the language used to instruct
juries on the use of "mandatory" and "permissive" presumptions, this scrutiny
of instructions is likely to be a highly subjective determination which will af-
fect the consistency of appellate review of presumption cases." Although
scrutiny of trial instructions is necessary to differentiate "conclusive" presump-
tions from other types of presumptions, the distinction made in Ulster is too
narrow to justify the broad discrepancy in the standards of review the Ulster
Court prescribed for "mandatory" and "permissive" presumptions.'" As a
result of the holding in Ulster, a slight difference in the wording of the jury
instructions can now make the difference between a presumption being
forced to satisfy the "reasonable doubt" test on its face, and the more likely
than not" test supported by the facts of the case.
125 See Tot, 319 U.S. at 467.
126 E.g., Barnes, 412 U.S. at 845.
127 E.g., Turner, 396 U.S. at 410-16.
126 A comparison of the instructions used in Leary, Romano and Gainey illustrates the
fine distinctions which appellate courts will be forced to make when classifying pre-
sumptions in future cases. The instructions in all three cases stated that proof of the
basic fact shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defen-
dant explains to the satisfaction of the jury. Yet the Ulster Court characterized the
presumption employed in Gainey as "permissive" because the trial judge explained to
the jury that they were not required to accept the presumption's inference, and clas-
sified those employed in Leary and Romano as mandatory. 442 U.S. at 157-60 nn.16 &
17. See text at notes 82-83 supra.
The difficulty in distinguishing between "mandatory" and "permissive" presump-
tions is also evidenced by the broad range of opinions among commentators concern-
ing the types of presumptions involved in past cases. See McCoRmicx, supra note 29, at
831; Ashford & Rissinger, supra note 45, at 201-02; Chicago Note, supra note Si, at
153; Note, Unburdening the Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Reasonable
Doubt Standard, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 390, 410-19 (1976).
' 2 ' The fact that no prior cases have mentioned the distinction between mandatory
and permissive presumptions in prescribing the appropriate standard may be taken as
an indication that it isn't warranted. See note 114 supra. The degree of difference in
practical effect between the two types of presumption is also questionable. The pre-
sumption employed in Barnes, which the Ulster Court described as "permissive," re-
sulted in a shift in the burden of going forward with evidence to the defendant. 412
U.S. at 846 11.11.
1010	 ROSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 21:990
Another result of the Ulster decision is to change the court's role when
reviewing "permissive presumptions. - Whenever a presumption is determined
to be "permissive, - the court must. look to the facts of the ease to see if a
rational juror could have made the connection inferred by the presumption.
This type of analysis ignores the effect the presumption may have had, and
merely considers the sufficiency of the evidence. As a result, the courts func-
tion in review becomes essentially that of a second factfinder re-examining the
evidence to see if it supports the verdict.'" This is not the court's proper
role. Instead, the appellate court should examine the presumption to deter-
mine whether it possesses a sufficient rational foundation to he constitution-
ally employed to influence the factfinder, regardless of what other evidence
was introduced.
As a consequence of this change in the court's role, it becomes very dif-
ficult to show that the use of a presumption has abridged any of the defen-
dant's due process rights as long as the presumption is clearly worded by the
trial judge in permissive terms. Because the Ulster standard allows a permis-
sive presumption's inference to be supported by the facts of the case, it may
result in a presumption with a tenuous connection being upheld because of
strong supporting facts. Therefore, it becomes very difficult for a permissive
presumption to be declared invalid unless the supporting facts are such that.
the presumption's inference is essential to a finding of guilt. The resulting
difficulty in challenging permissive presumptions is likely to result in a sig-
nificant relaxation of the scrutiny of these presumptions.
IV. A PROPOSED TEST FOR PRESUMPTIONS
A primary test that must be satisfied when considering any criminal con-
viction is the clue process guarantee announced in In re Winship: the prosecu-
tion must prove every fact which constitutes the crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt."' Any presumption invoked to aid in establishing an ele-
mental fact of the crime charged must be examined in light of this constitu-
tional guarantee to ensure that the prosecution's burden of proof has not
been lightened unconstitutionally. The test employed should require not only
that the burden of proof be properly controlled, but also should ensure that.
the inference authorized by the presumption has sufficient evidentiary sup-
port. 132 The Ulster standard for permissive presumptions, however, only ac-
complishes the first of these objectives. Under that standard, proof of the
basic fact of a permissive presumption may constitute prima facie evidence of
an elemental fact of the crime.'" Then, in light of the facts of the case, as
long as there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
presumed, and if the latter is more likely than not to flow from the former,
the prosecution can rely on all the facts in the record to support the factfind-
"" See text note 119 supra.
131 397 U.S. at 364.
132 See Jeffries and Stephan, Presumptions, Assumptions and the Burden of Proof, 88
YALE L.J. 1325, 1396 (1979); Comment, supra note 43, at 166.
133
 442 U.S. at 157.
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er's finding of the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the
presumption is permissive, the inference it makes is not required to meet any
test of sufficiency standing alone, but may rely on the facts of the case to
support its conclusion. This test ignores the possibility that the jury may rely
on the presumption for its decision regarding the presumed fact without con-
sidering whether the supporting evidence requires a conclusion of the ele-
mental fact beyond a reasonable doubt.'" The likelihood of a jury making a
conclusion based solely on a presumption becomes clearer in light of the
prominent position the presumption has in jury instructions.' 35 The instruc-
tion on a presumption directs the factfinder's attention to the inference per-
mitted by the presumption and gives the impression that either the court or
the legislature sanctions this conclusion. Such an instruction undoubtedly has
an influential effect on jurors, and requires that substantial opposing evidence
be introduced to ".overcome th  presumption.'
Once this likely effect on factlinders is understood, the potentially damag-
ing effect a presumption may have on he defendant's rights can be seen.
Although in a case relying on a "permissive" presumption it is within the trial
judge's discretion to decide whether the issue regarding the presumption
should be submitted to the jury,'" once he has submitted it he cannot ensure
that the factfinder will consider all the evidence to be sure that the presumed
elemental fact has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Instead, it
is likely that some jurors will base their conclusion solely on the presumption
which has been subjected only to the "more likely than not" test. If such is the
case, and the presumption involved would not satisfy a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" test, an elemental fact of the case has not been found beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the defendant's due process rights have been abridged.
To ensure that. these due process guarantees are not sacrificed, presump-
tions should be forced to satisfy a "beyond a reasonable doubt" test before
they can be invoked in the jury instructions to aid the prosecution in proving
its case."" The Court has recognized that jurors are likely to conclude a fact
inferred by a presumption, even though permissive, without considering
whether the evidence supports the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
Acknowledging this fact., the only way to ensure that a juror will find a fact
inferred by a presumption, which fact is an element of the crime charged,
134 In prior cases, the Court has acknowledged juries' susceptibility to basing their
conclusion solely on presumptions. See note 26 supra; see also United States v. Romano,
382 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1965).
' 3 " Sec note 38 supra.
' 3" See Ashford & Kissinger, supra note 42, at 9 03-05; Comment, supra note 40, at
169; St, Louis Note, supra note 70, at 232-33. .
"7 See note 76 supra.
"8 The defendant's due process rights are also made dependent on the itidge prop-
erly deciding whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of the fact
inferred by the presumption beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not as much of a
threat to these rights. however, since this is a judgment which judges should be qual-
ified and capable of making.
139 For some suggested standards for criminal presumptions. see Ashford & Ris-
singer„supra note 45, at 184-86; St. Louis Note, supra note 70. at 233.
''' See note 134 supra: see also text at notes 82 & 89 supra.
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beyond a reasonable doubt, is to require that the presumption satisfy a
"beyond a reasonable doubt" test on its face. Only if a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" test is adopted will the due process guarantee that the prosecution
prove every fact which constitutes the crime charged beyond a reasonable
doubt be protected.
Although such a test may result in some presumptions being removed
from the use of prosecutors, the magnitude of the impact of the adoption of
such a test is not likely to be great. Subjecting presumptions to this stricter test
of sufficiency will not eliminate them. The fact that many presumptions will
be able to meet this test was shown by the presumptions upheld in Turner ' 4 '
and Barnes '" which satisfied a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. It is
also questionable whether this test would increase unnecessarily the prepara-
tion which the prosecutor must undergo for a case. Under the standard an-
nounced in Ulster, the prosecution still must produce sufficient evidence to
permit a finding of any fact inferred by a permissive presumption beyond a
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the amount of evidence the prosecution must
amass and produce at the trial to prove the fact inferred by a permissive
presumption does not seem to differ from that required to prove a fact not
aided by a presumption. Considering the questionable impact which the adop-
tion of the "reasonable doubt" test will have on the prosecutor's task as com-
pared to the real threat to the defendant's due process rights which presump-
tions that do not satisfy a "beyond a reasonable doubt" test present, the bal-
ance weighs heavily in favor of requiring a "reasonable doubt" test.' 43
CONCLUSION
The Ulster decision held that permissive presumptions must be viewed in
light of all the facts of the case and that the fact presumed need only be
found to be "more likely than not" to flow from the fact proved for the pre-
sumption to be constitutionally employed. The decision also indicated that
mandatory presumptions should be required to satisfy a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" test on their face. While this decision clarifies long-standing uncer-
tainty over the proper test for presumptions, it raises questions about the pos-
sible infringement of the constitutional mandate which requires that the pros-
ecution prove every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Also,
because the Ulster standard requires that a "permissive presumption" be tested
in light of the facts of the case, the decision has made it very difficult to show,
in cases with strong supporting evidence, that the presumption has abridged
the defendant's rights, regardless of how weak the connection made by the
141 See text at note 915 supra.
"2 See text at note 97 supra.
"3 Powell's dissent in Ulster gives a strong indication that he believes that this is the
required standard: "it may well be that even those presumptions that do not shift the
burden of persuasion cannot be used to prove an element of the offense, if the facts
proved would not permit a reasonable mind to find the presumed fact beyond a
reasonable doubt." 442 U.S. at 169 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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presumption is. Because of the difficulty in showing that permissive presump-
tions have abridged any of the defendant's rights in cases with strong evi-
dence supporting the presumption's conclusion, this standard may result in
reduced scrutiny of presumptions. Whether these effects can be avoided is
something to be resolved in future cases.
ERIC L. WILSON
